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ESSAY
THINKING ABOUT LAW HISTORICALLY:
WHY BOTHER?
JOHN V. ORTH*
Having taught a course in Legal History for the past dozen years, I
should be able to answer the question "Why think about law histori-
cally?" And yet I find it difficult to begin-so unaccustomed am I to
fundamental questions. As a teacher I have been asked, usually more
than once, every imaginable question about the subject, except "Why
bother?" For students already enrolled in the course it is perhaps too
late to ask; those who avoid the course have plainly expressed their own
opinion on the matter. So I must pose the question myself and submit
my answers to a candid world.
The obvious reason for thinking about law historically is that it
helps us to solve problems in the present. To one degree or another, all
American states except Louisiana have accepted the common law of
England as the rule for decision in state courts, except to the extent that
it has been altered by later statute or case law. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, interpreting the state statute receiving the common law,'
has held that it means the common law of England as of the date of
American Independence, July 4, 1776.2 In any legal dispute in which it
would matter, this would require historical research into the law as it
was "long ago and far away."
Such forensic legal history interests me very little. I suspect that in
any case worth contesting, the law in question would not be clear. Com-
peting "experts" could be found by both sides, probably Professor This
and Professor That from local law schools. In the clash of adversaries
the fine subtleties and keen uncertainties of authentic legal history would
likely be lost. No practically-minded person in such a case would really
be interested in a well-balanced statement of the historical nuances and
ambiguities. The case would finally be decided-at least I hope it
* Reef C. Ivey II Research Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law.
A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University. This
essay originated as a speech delivered in the University of North Carolina School of Law's
Faculty Perspective Series.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4.1 (1986).
2. See Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 592, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971).
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would-with careful attention to what would make most sense in the
present. The past would, I suspect, prove accommodating.
There is, of course, a more general sense in which legal history is
said to assist us today. Benjamin Cardozo, with characteristic eloquence,
put it this way: "[H]istory, in illuminating the past, illuminates the pres-
ent, and in illuminating the present, illuminates the future."3 I applaud
and fully accept the shift from problem-solving to illumination; I myself
have earlier written that legal history can "by explaining how we got
where we are, explain more comprehensively where we are."4 In other
words, legal history can enrich our understanding of present law. To
that extent, I suppose, it may assist us as we seek to peer over the fences
into the future.
I do not mean to suggest that legal history as an intellectual pursuit
is the open sesame to unlock the mysteries that lie ahead. To be sure, the
future emerges from the present, but all the many linkages of cause and
effect, the frictions, the retrograde motions, and the hidden forces that
drive it forward, escape the observer's eye and always will. A well-edu-
cated human being, intuitively responding to other human beings, is our
best guide to the future, whether or not the mind in question is stuffed
with history, legal or otherwise. In a dozen years of observing my col-
leagues in higher education, I have discerned no particular discipline that
is more likely than any other to prepare its practitioners for the uncer-
tainties of the future-global, national, or personal. Recent events in
Central Europe or the Soviet Union, wholly unexpected by experts of all
stripes, are an example too obvious not to be mentioned.
Aside from providing a generalized guide to the future, legal history
is sometimes looked to for lessons in the present. Long sought, the "les-
sons of history" are too often, I fear, both a snare and a delusion. Marx-
ism's monumental embarrassment is only the most recent demonstration
of the futility (not to say the fatuity) of claiming to discern objective laws
of historical development. In explaining the problem we find help from
an unexpected source: Tom Sawyer-not in the famous book of his Ad-
ventures but in its almost unbelievably bad sequel, Tom Sawyer Abroad.
Amid the rubbish lies this gem:
[L]ike a considerable many lessons a body gets... [t]hey ain't
no account, because the thing don't ever happen the same way
again-and can't. The time Hen Scovil fell down the chimbly
and crippled his back for life, everybody said it would be a les-
3. BENJAMIN N. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 53 (1921).
4. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 159 (1987).
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son to him. What kind of a lesson? How was he going to use
it? He couldn't climb chimblies no more, and he hadn't no
more backs to break....
I ain't denying that a thing's a lesson if it's a thing that can
happen twice just the same way. There's lots of such things,
and they educate a person, that's what Uncle Abner always
said; but there's forty million lots of the other kind-the kind
that don't happen the same way twice-and they ain't no real
use....
But, on the other hand, Uncle Abner said that the person
that had took a bull by the tail once had learnt sixty or seventy
times as much as a person that hadn't, and said a person that
started in to carry a cat home by the tail was gitting knowledge
that was always going to be useful to him, and warn't ever go-
ing to grow dim or doubtful.'
Too many of history's lessons are like those Tom is talking about:
lessons about things that never happen the same way twice---"and they
ain't no real use." In the long history of the common law, forty million
such lessons is probably a conservative estimate. There are other kinds
of lessons that educate a person, but too often they take the form that
Tom's Uncle Abner had in mind: Don't take a bull by the tail. These
lessons range from the observation of a great historian that "Power tends
to corrupt"6 down to the absolute essentiality of the safeguards of due
process; for example, "Never make final decisions on ex parte representa-
tions," and "Always explain the reasons behind a judgment." History is
replete with illustrations of the deleterious consequences of ignoring
these simple verities. The problem here is that no extended study of legal
history is required to learn them, and-worse-there are a great many
other disciplines that teach the same lessons more directly. Only human-
kind's obdurate unwillingness to learn keeps all these instructors busy.
Another reason for historical study, one we hear a great deal about
these days, is what might be called history's legitimating function. Ideas
seem to be taken more seriously if they have a long pedigree to back them
up. A related notion is that history may supply heroes-role models, if
you prefer-to inspire those who can identify with them. Neither ap-
proach is new. A century ago Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, Jr.
published an influential article in the Harvard Law Review in which they
provided an impressive, if somewhat dubious, parentage for the right of
5. MARK TWAIN, TOM SAWYER ABROAD 85-86 (1878).
6. BARTLETf'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 615 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980)
(Lord Acton).
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privacy.7 The latest biographer of Justice Joseph Story, who did so
much to establish American commercial law in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, describes Story as anxious to emulate the reforming British judge
Lord Mansfield.'
To some degree this role for history shares the defects of forensic
legal history. All too often it becomes a mere search for friendly faces (or
compatible ideas) in the past; at its worst it involves exaggeration ap-
proaching falsification. This is not to deny that much of the older legal
history is tendentious, although not quite so programmatic. The alert
reader must be ever on the lookout to discern the particular tendency.
What bothers me about embracing history's legitimating function is that
such an approach increases the risk of violating the integrity of the past
by imposing on it the agendas of the present. There is a sinister, as well
as a benign, meaning to the notion that those who seek, find. As for role
models, there can be no denying that for most of American history the
leaders of bench and bar were middle-aged Protestant white males from
the comfortable classes. Unless one can meet them on some plane that
transcends the particularities of age, religion, race, sex, and economics-
not to mention time-one will look to them in vain for guides. No one
should underestimate the feat of historical imagination that this calls for.
'Perhaps it is time for me to take the bull by the horns and provide
some better answers to my question, "Why bother to think about law
historically?" To begin with, one should not overlook the sheer pleasure
that some minds take in contemplating the past. I say "some minds"
advisedly, because I am aware from experience that the charms of the
past do not appeal to all persons equally. This, by the way, is a fact to
rejoice in; if all minds were turned the same way, we would have less
chance to find our way out of the maze in which we wander. To return
to the main point, some of us think about law historically because it is
natural-and of compelling interest. The time long ago arrived when we
should have shucked off the notion that if a subject interests us, it is
entertainment rather than education. This joy-denying tenet of Calvin-
ism lingers on in law school in the form of taking courses that are "good
for us" instead of those that interest us. On the law review it means
7. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
For a historian's critique of their presentation, see WALTER PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 19-
37 (1979).
8. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF
THE OLD REPUBLIC 246 (1985); see also CHARLES BANE, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to
Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 351, 366 (1983) (noting Story's reliance on Mansfield's opinions).
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placing a premium on the tedious and obscure and assuming that the
clear and appealing is not scholarly.
The joy of the past lies in part in its strangeness. When we listen
with a trained ear we hear melodies undreamed of. A sentence from a
familiar text illustrates the point: When the framers of the federal Con-
stitution empowered Congress "to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," 9 they wrote
in elegant eighteenth-century prose, as balanced and symmetrical as Pal-
ladian architecture. Science is promoted by authors in their writings,
while useful arts are advanced by inventors in their discoveries. Without
realizing that "science" in the eighteenth century meant any organized
body of knowledge,10 not merely that of the white-coated specialist in the
laboratory, we truly hear the passage transposed into the wrong key.
The excitement begins when we accept the strangeness of the past, when
we realize that we are listening to a foreign language-and that it is
English!
Understanding this may bring us enlightenment, and spare us em-
barrassment. Not so very long ago the North Carolina Supreme Court
misread one of its earliest and most important precedents: Bayard v. Sin-
gleton, I the case that established judicial review in the state sixteen years
before Marbury v. Madison 12 established it at the federal level. Speaking
for the court in Bayard in May 1786, Judge Samuel Ashe referred to the
fact that "the people of this country ... by their delegates, met in Con-
gress, and formed that system of those fundamental principles comprised
in the constitution."1" Two centuries later the state supreme court
thought he was "[o]bviously referring to our national government"; 4
this despite the fact that the federal constitution was not drafted until
more than a year after Ashe spoke-and the even more obvious fact that
Congress did not draft it. Judge Ashe was actually referring to the state
constitution, drafted and adopted by North Carolina's Fifth Provincial
Congress in 1776. In contemporary parlance "this country" meant "this
state." Anyone who had not undergone a thorough process of national
acculturation would have suspected as much-that is, today only non-
Americans and those with historical training.
The strangeness of the past is a point easily made and readily ac-
9. U.S. CONsr. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. See 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 221 (1933).
II. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787).
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart.) at 6-7.
14. State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 599, 286 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1982).
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cepted. Property teachers know better than most about the weird lega-
cies of too long a history: the fee tail"5 and the Rule in Shelley's Case, 6
to name just two. Other disciplines have a few relics of their own, of
course, often just as bizarre but less obvious because they are dressed up
in the latest fashion. To quote myself once more: "It is much easier to
make fun of the past than of the present, but much less important."' 7
One of the prime reasons, then, for thinking about the past is that it
gives us a new viewpoint on the present; putting it irreverently, it em-
powers us to make fun of the present, humor depending almost wholly
upon one's point of view. I will stake my soul that right up there with
"fear of the Lord" at the beginning of wisdom is a sense of humor, and
the sense of perspective it provides. Examples of what I have in mind
abound, although you have heard less of them, for the same reason that
we are more likely to make jokes about our parents' eccentricities than
about our own.
We may begin with an example itself drawn from the past. A hun-
dred years ago the system known as workmen's compensation was a new
idea, and many lawyers and judges thought it unconstitutional because it
took property from one and gave it to another without regard to fault.'8
Oliver Wendell Holmes in a characteristic passage had foreseen the sys-
tem with its "tariff for life and limb"'--so much for an arm, a leg, an
eye-and compared it to ancient legal systems; workmen's compensation
was, he observed, like the leges barbarorum.0 Nothing, he implied, was
15. See John V. Orth, Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?, 23 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 767 (1988).
16. See John V. Orth, Requiem for the Rule in Shelley's Case, 67 N.C. L. REV. 681 (1989).
17. Id at 687.
18. See, eg., Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 317, 94 N.E. 431, 448 (1911).
19. 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897).
20. The leges barbarorum were the "laws of the barbarians," so called to distinguish them
from the leges Romanae, the "laws of the Romans." The earliest Anglo-Saxon legal compila-
tion was the Laws of Ethelbert, promulgated about 600 A.D.
Ethelbert's laws are remarkable for the extraordinarily detailed schedules of tariffs
established for various injuries: so much for the loss of a leg, so much for an eye, so
much if the victim was a slave, so much if he was a freeman, so much if he was a
priest. The four front teeth were worth six shillings each, the teeth next to them four,
the other teeth one; thumbs, thumbnails, forefingers, middle fingers, ring fingers, lit-
tle fingers, and their respective fingernails were all distinguished, and a separate
price, called a bot, was set for each. Similar distinctions were made among ears
whose hearing was destroyed, ears cut off, ears pierced, and ears lacerated; among
bones laid bare, bones damaged, bones broken, skulls broken, shoulders disabled,
chins broken, collar bones broken, arms broken, thighs broken, and ribs broken; and
among bruises outside the clothing, bruises under the clothing, and bruises which did
not show black.




new under the sun-at least to one learned in the past. This was one of
the reasons Holmes could transcend the furious certainties of his breth-
ren on the bench. It permitted his famous detachment and tolerance; it
helped to make him Olympian.
Let us come closer to home. Starting in the District of Columbia in
the 1970s courts and legislatures suddenly began to read a warranty of
habitability into residential leases. This departure was frequently ex-
plained by confident references to increased apartment dwelling, the de-
mise of the agrarian tenant (supposedly a "jack of all trades" able to
repair the leasehold), and even the decline of feudalism.21 Few legal logi-
cians seemed to realize that while all the changes mentioned had oc-
curred before the doctrinal development, some had occurred so long
before it as to render such explanations implausible. Could it be that the
cause was not so remote? Without the federally funded legal services for
the poor that became available in the 1960s, would the other causes have
been sufficient to break the hardened wax of old doctrine?22 I doubt it.
A few years ago one heard much about how busy the United States
Supreme Court was. Chief Justice Warren Burger was in full cry on
every occasion about how he and the brethren were overworked. To one
who knew something about legal history it presented an odd contrast to
the old common law courts in England, where judges for centuries com-
plained just, as loudly about not being busy enough. The explanation, as
I have pointed out elsewhere, was that in those earlier days the judges
reaped a sizeable part of their income from court fees that litigants
paid.23 Could it be that if judicial compensation today depended on out-
put, we would hear less about judicial overload?
In the early 1980s the federal government experimented with block
grants to the states. In North Carolina, the governor and general assem-
bly squabbled about who should receive the money, and the justices of
the state supreme court were asked by the parties for an advisory opin-
ion.24 Should someone knowledgeable in constitutional history have re-
minded them about how much blood had been spilled to secure for the
legislature the power of the purse? Would a state governor with extra-
legislative money to spend resemble the Stuart kings who threatened
21. Javins v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
22. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 n.12 (Supp. 1977).
23. John V. Orth, A Reverie on Medieval Judges, Milton Friedman, and the Supreme
Court's Workload, 69 A.B.A. J. 1454, 1458 (1983).
24. Advisory Opinion in re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 295 S.E.2d 589 (1982).
See John V. Orth, "Forever Separate and Distinct" Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62
N.C. L. REV. 1, 19-23 (1983).
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England's tradition of consultative government? And what about the
state supreme court? Was there something odd (or even comic) about a
court with no express constitutional or statutory authority solemnly lec-
turing the other branches on separation of powers? Because the "case or
controversy" requirement that all other American courts observe was in-
tended to keep the judiciary within its proper sphere, is there not some-
thing more than faintly oxymoronic about the caption Advisory Opinion
in re Separation of Powers?2"
One final example. A few years ago the federal courts began to
wrestle with the difficult question of the free speech rights of artists. As
you might have guessed, given our society's special concern with one part
of human anatomy, the artwork in question involved the representation
of nudes. Long before Robert Mapplethorpe there was a university art
instructor who produced paintings in which human genitalia were de-
picted in what was described by the court as "clinical detail."' 26 The
work was removed from display in the student union, and the artist was
denied First Amendment protection.27 I for one was struck by the fact
that it seemed to be held against this aspiring Michelangelo that his art-
work was anatomically accurate. The history of Renaissance art, surely
one of the West's crowning cultural achievements, was the story of hard-
won victories to achieve perspective and "clinical detail." In a famous
passage Justice Holmes once lectured his colleagues about reading into
the Constitution the economics of Mr. Herbert Spencer. 28 Are we con-
demned to endure the fate-arguably more awful-of seeing our Consti-
tution incorporate the coy aesthetics of Maxfield Parrish?
What I am suggesting, of course, is that we subject the present to the
same process of radical inquiry that we are so certain would have been
beneficial for our ancestors. Just as law students long ago should have
challenged their torts teachers on the point of whether workers really
assumed the risk of injury from the fault of fellow servants, and just as
law students in the first half of the twentieth century should have chal-
lenged their constitutional law teachers on the point of whether racially
separate education really was equal, so students today should be chal-
lenging their teachers on the most pervasive commonplaces-everything
from the need for consideration in contract to the presuppositions of
"reasonableness" in tort, even to the point of asking whether the current
25. The court may have seen the joke. See State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438,
454, 385 S.E.2d 473, 481 (1989) (referring to "advisory opinions formerly issued on occasion
by this Court") (emphasis added).
26. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 989-90 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970).
27. Id.
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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emphasis on individual rights has begun to frustrate humanity's deep
need for community. To quote Holmes again--one of his choicest obser-
vations-"To have doubted one's own first principles is the mark of a
civilized man."2 9
History is a veritable storehouse of such seditious questions. This is
not to say, of course, that other avenues of attack are not provided by
other disciplines. Logic alone, unaided by history, can mount powerful
offensives. But logic is most persuasive when operating within the as-
sumptions of the opponent. Consistency, in other words, is logic's
strongest suit. Once outside or at odds with the opponent's assumptions,
logic generally fails to persuade. What ensues is the famous (and fa-
mously unproductive) dialogue of the deaf. But the logic of history is not
the logic of logic. We are all inheritors of our muddled past and there-
fore our allies from the past are already within the gates, so to speak.
For the conduct of legal education, legal history has its own valua-
ble contributions. An old law professor's game is quickly to stake out a
logical position and then defy all challengers more or less obnoxiously.
History punctures the pretense, not just with its myriad examples of an-
cient and honorable civility; it also demonstrates how many such
loudmouths were wrong in the past. Because history is far less likely
than logic to deal in absolutes, it trains its devotees in the fine and hum-
bling art of balancing uncertainties without being paralyzed by them.
29. Quoted in JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 274 (1930).
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